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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay engages the idea(l) of the rule of law and its relationship to
the human rights ideal. This piece opens by exploring just exactly what is
meant by the rule of law. To develop this analysis, this work initially
explores the definitions, elements, and theoretical underpinnings of the rule
of law. Second, it delves into the cultural particularities of the rule of law;
third, it describes numerous structural realities of the rule of law; and then,
it sets out several of the critiques directed at a universal rule of law idea(l).
* Levin Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I
want to thank Nancy Dowd, Jane Larson, Pedro Malavet, Bill Page, Sharon Rush, Christopher
Slobogin and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse for their useful comments on an earlier draft and to
Kenneth Nunn, Reginald Robinson, and Anthony Farley for wonderful reading suggestions. Thanks
also to Elizabeth Crowder (UF '05) and Cindy Zimmerman for invaluable research and editorial
assistance, and to Rickey Shelton for help on word processing.
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This essay next makes three key observations concerning the rule of law:
(1) the relationship between the rule of law and human rights; (2) the
interrelatedness of the international rule of law to a local rule of law; and
(3) the insights the concept of the rule of law affords to the exploration of
the nexus between trade and human rights.
To conclude, this piece suggests a holistic approach to the rule of law.
Such a model recognizes both the instrumental or rule book dimension and
the substantive or rights dimension of the rule of law. It also accepts that
the rule of law, while universal in its conceptualization, must
accommodate cultural particularities of different societies. Moreover, this
model acknowledges that local and global versions of the rule of law
operate coherently in these different geographies, and that both local and
global rule of law discourses are bounded by human rights parameters of
full personhood, dignity, and justice.
II. THE RULE OF LAW IDEA(L)
Defining the rule of law is a difficult undertaking; it almost seems that
the rule of law is somewhat like the Potter Stewart vision about obscenity:
we know it when we see it.' This observation suggests that each person,
group, or nation can have a different vision of the rule of law. The
definitional challenge derives from the reality that the rule of law is a
contested concept.2 With the passing of time, different conceptions have
evolved. Moreover, different legal traditions have divergent understandings
of what the rule of law idea(l) is or should be.
The modern idea of the rule of law has been traced as far back as
Aristotle for whom the rule of law was tantamount to the rule of reason.3
Others have identified the rule of law with natural law or respect for
transcendent rights.4 The term itself, however, at least in its contemporary
I. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 791 (1989).
3. See Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL
OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (describing Aristotle's
view that the rule of law is "nothing less than the rule of reason").
4. See Walter Berns, Foreword: Natural Law, Natural Rights, 61 U. CiN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1992) ("[Mlan is by nature inclined ... toward a variety of ends that possess a natural order....
The natural law consists of commands and prohibitions directing [man's] actions toward these
ends."); Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. J=IS. 143,
163 (2002) ("[T]he 'natural law'.. . theory of law, which goes back at least as far as Aristotle....
is based on rational reflection on the nature, conditions, and experience of being a 'free and equal'
human being in a world with other such beings."); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1510 (1988) ("[Elach person, whether she knows it or not, ought to accept the law in
(Vol. 16
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usage, is more directly traced to the British jurist Albert Venn Dicey, who
articulated it as follows:
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law
established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the
land.... We mean in the second place,. . . not only that with us no man
is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man,
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.'
There are close ties between Dicey's conception of the rule of law and
liberalism.6 At its foundation, the rule of law provides predictability and
guidance; in conduct, it enhances individual autonomy. Modem theorists
have observed that three characteristics are central to a cogent notion of the
rule of law: (1) absence of arbitrary power on the part of the government;
(2) administration of ordinary law by ordinary tribunals; and (3) existence
of general rules of constitutional equality resulting from the ordinary law
of the land.' With these characteristics, the rule of law serves three
purposes: (1) it protects against anarchy; (2) it allows persons to rely on
laws and plan their lives in a way in which they can predict what
consequences will flow from their actions; and (3) it protects against
arbitrary and capricious action of the government. 9
Because this essay engages the international law, it is instructive to
juxtapose Dicey's and the International Commission of Jurists' definitions
of the rule of law. In its Rule of Law Project, the International Commission
defined the rule of law in a manner that fits a diverse global world:
The principles, institutions and procedures, not always identical but
broadly similar, which the experience and traditions of lawyers in
different countries of the world, often having themselves varying political
question as conformable to some assertedly objective notion of reason, nature, fairness, utility, or
other criterion of rightness.").
5. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 179, 185
(5th ed., 1897); see also Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 943, 945 n.4 (1958).
6. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1997) (citing A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 181, 205 (2d ed. 1959)).
7. Brian Tamanaha, Theory, in ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 12 n.31
(forthcoming 2004) (citing Jeremy Waldron, The Role of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory, 2
RATIO JURIS 79, 84-85 (1989)), available at http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/law-tamanaha.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003).
8. DICEY, supra note 5, at 179-92; see also Radin, supra note 2, at 781 n.2.
9. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 7-8.
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structures and economic backgrounds, have shown to be important to
protect the individual from arbitrary government and to enable him to
enjoy the dignity of man."
Like Dicey's definition, the Commission's version addresses the three
concerns regarding arbitrary government power: basic laws,
implementation, and a higher authority. In domestic contexts, the higher
authority is constitutional norms; in the international realm, the higher
authority is human dignity which, this essay posits, translates to human
rights.
Given this human rights connection, it is interesting to note the
existence of "two very different conceptions of the rule of law,"" either of
which may serve the purposes of the rule of law. One, which Dworkin calls
the "rule book" model, is narrow and holds that the government can only
exercise power against persons according to "rules explicitly set out in a
public rule book available to all . . . [which] must be followed until
changed."' 2 This approach does not concern itself with the content of the
rules. 3 Others view such an account of the rule of law as an instrumental
version which provides that "the rule of law is a prerequisite for any
efficacious legal order."14
The instrumental conception of the rule of law coincides with Lon
Fuller's eight elements that comprise "the morality that makes law
possible."'5 While Fuller couches these elements in morality and Raz
grounds them in positivism, they closely track in substance. 6 Fuller's
conditions for law are: (1) generality; (2) notice or publicity/promulgation;
(3) prospectivity/nonretroactivity; (4) clarity; (5) consistency/noncontradic-
10. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF THE RuLE OF LAW
IN THE MODERN AGE, Report on the Proceedings of the South-East Asian and Pacific Conference
of Jurists, Bangkok, Thailand, Feb. 15-19, 1965, at 17 (citing the working definition of the rule of
law as a dynamic concept, adopted by the Commission at the New Delhi Congress in 1959). It is
noteworthy that although it is a relatively recent document, this definition uses the traditional,
liberal theory gender-exclusive term dignity of "man." A better term would be dignity of persons.
See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
11. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1985).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Radin, supra note 2, at 783.
15. Id. at 784-85 (citing LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 157 (rev. ed. 1969)). Radin
labels the instrumental version as "How to Do Things with Rules."
16. See infra text accompanying note 28 (articulating eight principles for the rule of law).
(Vol. 16
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toriness; (6) obeyability/conformability; (7) stability; and (8) congruence/
consistent application.
17
However, these eight elements can be reduced to two basic principles:
(1) rules must exist and (2) rules that exist must be able to be followed,
based both on their clarity and their fairness.18 To be sure, these elements
incorporate notions of morality in the requirements of obeyability and
fairness.
Dworkin's second conception is the "rights" notion of the rule of law,
which is more attuned to the human rights idea as
[i]t assumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one
another, and political rights against the state as a whole [and] ... insists
that these moral and political rights be recognized in positive law .... [I]t
requires that the rules in the rule book capture and enforce moral
rights.... It supposes that citizens have moral rights ... rights other than
and prior to those given by positive enactment. 9
Some regard this rendering of the rule of law as a substantive version
which holds that "the rule of law embodies tenets of a particular political
morality."2
17. Radin, supra note 2, at 784-85; Andrei Marmor, The Rule of Law and Its Limits, USC
Public Policy Research PaperNo. 03-16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424613 (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003); see also CASS, infra note 38, at 6-8 (noting Fuller's eight-condition approach).
18. Radin, supra note 2, at 785; see also infra text accompanying note 26 (listing the two
aspects of the rule of law from Raz's formalistic perspective).
19. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 11-13. It is important to note that references to moral rights
raises the comparative legal question of what those rights are. States with different legal, political,
cultural, and historical traditions similarly have different approaches to moral rights. Even states
viewed as having shared political ideologies, such as the United States on the one hand and western
European states on the other, have very different approaches to moral rights. The European
adoption, to an extent, of canonical moral rights generates a much broader conception than that of
the United States. It is "hornbook" law that in the United States a promise without tangible,
valuable consideration does not generally constitute an enforceable contract. JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERLLO ON CONTRACTS 172 (5th ed. 2003) (consideration required, "donative
promises generally are not enforced"). Courts might find that a "moral" obligation exists, but that
is not generally the basis for an enforceable right. Id. at 228-29 ("promise in recognition of a moral
obligation" not generally enforceable). In civil law systems, on the other hand, so-called gratuitous
promises establish a legal obligation that is enforceable in court. For example, donations, inter vivos
gifts, or real or personal property constitute valid and enforceable contracts if accepted by the
recipient. Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: The Latin Notary, A Historical and
Comparative Model, 19 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 389, 459 (1996) (describing inter vivos
gifts and providing citations to civil codes of several countries).
20. Radin, supra note 2, at 783.
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The substantive conception of the rule of law is one of formal justice
which promotes liberty.2 The substantive conceptualization of the rule of
law has four requirements. First, "ought implies can."22 This requirement
suggests that the persons subject to the rule of law must be able to conform
to the norm and that those in charge of enforcing the norm must act in
good faith. Therefore, "[i]mpossibility of conformance . . . must be
recognized as a defense."23 Second, similar cases must be treated similarly.
This precept incorporates the requirement of consistency and limiting
judicial discretion.24 Third, there can be no crime without law. This
principle embraces the notions that law must be known, published, clear,
general, and not retroactive. Finally, the fourth factor provides that
structures that allow the rule of law to function need to exist - trials,
hearings, rules of evidence, due process, competent advocates, impartial
and independent judges, and fair and open trials.2" This substantive model
also embraces morality.
Other theorists have provided slightly different, but consistent,
interpretations of the meaning, content, and context of the rule of law. In
Raz's formalistic approach, the rule of law "has two aspects: (1) that
people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and (2) that the law should
be such that people will be able to be guided by it."26 Centrally,
the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects. It is
evident that this conception of the rule of law is a formal one. It says
nothing about how the law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic
majorities, or any other way. It says nothing about fundamental rights,
about equality, or justice."
He expands on this idea by listing eight important principles that can be
gleaned from the rule of law idea:
(1) All laws should be respective, open, and clear....
(2) Laws should be relatively stable....
21. Id. at 787 (noting that "Rawls may be read as making the stronger claim that the rule of
law is required for liberty") (construing JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235 (1971)). Radin
refers to this substantive conception as "How to Foster Liberty and Constrain Leviathan." Id.
22. Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 93 n.377 (2003) (paraphrasing ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUELKANT'S MORAL
THEORY 320 n.6 (1989)).
23. Id. at 788 n.25 (citing RAWLS, supra note 21, at 239).
24. Id.; see Walter E. Williams, False Civil Rights Vision and Contempt for Rule of Law, 79
GEO. L.J. 1777 (1991) (discussing the need to treat similarly situated persons similarly).
25. Radin, supra note 2, at 788.
26. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AuTHORrrY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MoRALrY 210, 213 (1979).
27. Id. at 214.
[Vol. 16
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(3) The making of particular laws (particular legal orders) should be
guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules....
(4) The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed....
(5) The principles of natural justice must be observed....
(6) The courts should have review powers over the implementation of the
other principles....
(7) The courts should be easily accessible....
(8) The discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed
to pervert the law.28
The instrumental or rule book conception and the substantive or rights
conception of law have common "philosophical underpinnings. 29 Yet,
notwithstanding these commonalities, the instrumental and substantive
28. Id. at 214-18. As with the notion of moral rights, judicial independence is an interesting
comparative issue. "Judicial independence" is viewed in radically different ways on the opposite
sides of the Atlantic. The "American" view is that the judiciary is a separate and coequal branch of
government with the power to limit the actions of the other two branches. The U.S. judiciary largely
defines its own discretion. Marbury is perhaps the most famous example of this power in American
law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). "It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. But to the French, the ordinary
judiciary is not a branch of government that is equal to the legislative and the executive. See
generally RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
133-46 (3d ed. 1985) (describing French and other civil law systems' approaches to the judiciary).
Therefore, the power of the judiciary is severely limited by law. For example, Article 5 of the
French Civil Code provides: "Judges are forbidden to pronounce decisions by way of general and
regulative dispositions on causes which are submitted to them." CODE CIvIL art. 5 (Fr.) (John H.
Crabb trans.). Moreover, in France only the administrative adjudication system, which is not
considered to be part of the "ordinary"judiciary, has the general power to review executive action,
and legislative action may only be reviewed by the constitutional council, a specialized body that
is only allowed to invalidate legislation before it is signed into law by the president. In other
systems, such as those of Spain, Germany, and Italy, specialized constitutional courts have been
created to resolve constitutional questions but their power and the legal effect of their decisions are
expressly defined by constitutional provisions.-See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE
CIVIL LAWTRADITION: EUROPE, EASTASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 750-57 (1994) (general approach
to "ordinaryjudiciary"); id. 729-40 (describing administrative adjudication in France and Germany,
among others); id 757-801 (describing French Constitutional Council, and Spanish, German, and
Italian constitutional courts).
29. Radin, supra note 2, at 792. Specifically, Radin notes five shared assumptions of both
conceptions:
(1) law consists of rules; (2) rules are prior to particular cases, more general than particular
cases, and applied to particular cases; (3) law is instrumental (the rules are applied to
achieve ends); (4) there is a radical separation between government and citizens (there are
rule-givers and appliers, versus rule-takers and compliers); (5) the person is a rational
chooser ordering her affairs instrumentally.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 11-13 (introducing Dworkin's rule book and rights
models).
HeinOnline  -- 16 Fla. J. Int'l L. 173 2004
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNA7ONAL LAW
conceptions of the rule of law are different because "[t]he instrumental
conception is a model of government by rules to achieve the government's
ends... [whereas t]he substantive conception is a model of government
by rules to achieve the goals of the social contract: liberty and justice."3
It is appropriate to note two other important conceptual distinctions.
One is the difference between the notions of rule of law and rule by law.
The other is the distinction between the ideas of rule of law and rule of
men.
First, on the one hand, the rule of law provides that no one is above the
law, not even the government, which itself is subject to norms and
normative standards.3' This notion of the rule of law provides that law's
authority emanates from its autonomy. As such, the rule of law satisfies its
three characteristic meanings.32 Significantly, as discussed above, the rule
of law can possess an instrumental or rule book conceptualization which,
unlike the substantive or rights model discussed by Dworkin,33 is not
linked to notions of justice or fairness. As Raz, who focused on law not
only as formal but also as positive,34 has famously stated,
A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights...
may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better
than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western
democracies .... It will be an immeasurably worse legal system, but it
will excel in one respect: in its conformity to the rule of law.35
Such a notion of rule of law can be invoked against the powerless and such
"a version... has no memory and no soul. ' 36
30. Radin, supra note 2, at 792.
31. BARRY HAGER, THE RULE OF LAW: A LEXICON FOR POLICY MAKERS 23 (The Mansfield
Center for Pacific Affairs, 2000), available at http://www.mcpa.org/programs/rol_lexicon.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003) (noting "th[e] idea that the government itself is bound by law is the heart of
the Western contribution to the doctrine of the Rule of Law"); see also Raz, supra note 26, at 212;
Bo Li, Whatls Rule ofLaw?, PERSPECTIVES, Vol. 1 No. 5 (2000), available at http://www.oycf.org/
Perspectives/5. 043000/what is rule of law.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
32. See Radin, supra note 2; see Li, supra note 31 ("[Rlule of law has at least three meanings.
First, rule of law is a regulator of government power. Second, rule of law means equality before
law. Third, rule of law means procedural and formal justice.").
33. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13 & 19-29.
34. Tamanaha, supra note 7, at 9 (describing Joseph Raz as among those "[lI]egal positivists
[who] point out that a legal system possessing the elements of the rule of law may nonetheless have
laws with terribly unjust content").
35. Raz, supra note 26, at 211.
36. Lawrence H. Tribe, Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 726, 729 (referring to
a version of the rule of law that was invoked against Native Americans in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988)).
[Vol. 16
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There are some who see virtues or values in the rule of law, such as
"separation of powers, equality, liberty, substantive fairness, procedural
fairness, and utility.3s7 Others presuppose justice as part of the rule of law
equation. As Ronald Cass stated, "In a fundamentally just society, the rule
of law serves to channel decision making in attractive ways, to make
decisions more predictable, and to increase the prospects for fair
administration of public power."38 This vision, imbued with aspirations of
justice and morality, coincides with the substantive model. Both the
instrumental or rule book and the substantive or rights models, however
different, confirm that even the government is subject to the rule of law.
On the other hand, rule by law signifies law as an instrument of
government which then is an entity that is above the law. 9 The problem
with rule by law is that it "is substantively empty ... [and] is compatible
with, and may be instituted by, a system that contains the most immoral of
laws.... The rule [by] law, at least under this dominant theoretical view,
contains no substantive moral standards as an aspect of its definition."4
The other distinction that is noteworthy is the rule of law versus the rule
of men,4 which some suggest would be more appropriately articulated as
37. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279,314
(1985).
38. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA, at xi (2001). Cass articulates four
constitutive elements to the rule of law: (1) fidelity to rules; (2) predictability; (3) embodiment in
valid authority; and (4) externality to individual government decision makers. Id. at 4-19; see also
DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that "compliance with the rule book is plainly not sufficient
for justice ... [but a] society that achieves a high rating on ... the rights conception is almost
certainly a just society, even though it may be mismanaged").
39. Li, supra note 31.
40. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 98-99 (2001).
The author notes that approaches of Fuller, Weber, and Habermas, because of their view of law as
instrumental, and their identification of law with reason, all lead to "substantively empty"
approaches to law which focus on procedural and formal aspects and do not focus on "the
traditional test for the legitimacy of law in its consistency with the content of moral principles or
with prevailing customs." Id. at 102. Tamanaha goes on to note:
Instead of reflecting the substantive content of moral beliefs, the liberal (empty) rule of law
reflects a liberal culture, both embodying the value of toleration for different views in an age
of irreducible moral pluralism. That begs the question of whether the cultures with the rule
of law are indeed liberal in this sense - whether toleration is truly a prevailing cultural
value.
Id. at 103.
41. This is often articulated as "the rule of law, not of men." Fallon, supra note 6, at 3; John
Adams, Novanglus No. 7, January 1775, available at http://douglassarchives.org/adam_a5O. htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2003) ("[Aristotle, Livy, and Harrington] define a republic to be a government
of laws, and not of men"). The phrase "government of laws, not of men" is frequently mistakenly
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"the rule of law, not of individuals."42 This alternative phrasing recalls the
reality that when the liberal ideal of the rule of law developed only men -
white men at that - could be part of political life.43 The distinction,
however articulated, is poignant. Contrary to the rule of law promise of
procedural fairness, honesty, and consistency, the rule of men "has the
connotation of arbitrariness, corruption, and instability.""
III. THE RULE OF LAW AND CULTURE
The idea ofjust laws is a difficult and complex one.45 For example, the
rule of law in the western tradition emphasizes individual rights. Other
philosophical foundations emphasize communitarian duties and
responsibilities. The western vision does not, however, reject the
communitarian ideals that are the focal point in other legal traditions. To
the contrary, the western view presumes not only that communitarian
ideals embrace the individual, but also that by protecting the individual the
community's desires will be fulfilled.46 So which version, the western or
the Asian, best fulfills the rule of law goals of liberty and justice? To
answer this question, we must travel squarely to the heart of the ongoing
debate about the nature of norms - whether they are universal or
culturally relative - a question that is quite vibrant particularly with
respect to human rights.47
attributed directly to Adams. See, e.g., Louis E. Wolcher, What Is the Rule of Law?, Perspectives
from Central Europe and the American Academy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 515, 516 (2003).
42. Radin, supra note 2, at 781 n.I (rephrasing the ideal in "today's context").
43. Id.; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989); CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988).
44. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 10-11, Carnegie Endowment
Working Papers No. 30, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp30.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003). Upham notes that "[r]ule of law building is not worth spending money on
unless the imperfect institutions created by such expenditures will have beneficial effects that
outweigh their costs and any harm they create." Id. at 13.
45. See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12 (observing the "rights" model is "a complex ideal").
46. See HAGER, supra note 31, at 20.
[Tihe Western rule of law by no means dismisses these communitarian values that are
elevated in various Asian traditions. Rather, it assumes first ofall that those communitarian
values include respect for individual rights, and second that the best method of maximizing
the communal interest is through the protection and vindication of individual substantive
procedural rights.
Id.
47. See Berta E. Hemrndez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights-Rules, Realities and
the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605 (1996).
[Vol. 16
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In brief, the universalist versus relativist discussion goes as follows. On
the one hand, the universalists urge that laws are of universal reach and
must be evenly applied, with no exceptions and no excuses. On the other
hand, relativists insist that laws are culturally contingent and must be
applied only according to local understandings.
In this essay, as I have done before,48 1 suggest that both universalists
and relativists are correct. In the international context, as the International
Commission of Jurists' definition of the rule of law suggests, 49 rules need
to be both universal in reach and relative in interpretation and application.
This position is especially desirable in the global context. The world is an
intricate and heterogeneous place comprised of many societies and as many
forms of cultural expression, all of which have powerful, dominant actors
and vulnerable, subordinated ones.
In this regard, it is indisputable that to both universalists and relativists,
culture matters. Local traditions, including religious traditions, have had
a large and lasting influence on contemporary values.5" These various
locations of cultural power and authority create a tension with human
rights norms which both advocates and philosophers posit are theoretically
grounded on a source of law that is supra-sovereign and universal, and
transcends cultural, national, and religious boundaries to provide a uniform
moral code. Thus, universalists view human rights as having existed prior
to political societies and institutions.51 This conceptualization is
problematic for cultural relativists who claim that all rights are culturally
contingent and that the foundations of any normative standards are the
unique political, religious, and civic institutions of a society. Relativists
reject the possibility of the existence of any individual rights of persons
independent of society and culture. In sum, relativists insist that, because
society and culture construct all values, there can be no such thing as the
presocial or prepolitical human rights embraced by universalists.52
48. Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Human Rights, Globalization, and Culture: Centering
Personhood in International Narrative, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 353
(Berta E. Hemndez-Truyol ed., 2002).
49. See text accompanying note 10.
50. Ronald Inglehart & Pippa Norris, The True Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar.
1, 2003, at 62.
51. Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5
BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 212 (1999) (noting "[human rights advocates) assert[] that all
persons, regardless of culture, citizenship and nationality have inherent rights"); see also DWORKIN,
supra note 11, at 13 (noting that the rights model of the rule of law "supposes that citizens have
moral rights... [that are] prior to those given by positive enactment") (emphasis added).
52. Binder, supra note 51, at 214. He adds that "[b]oth sides in the cultural-
relativism/universalism debate see the same dilemma: either International Human Rights Law is
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In recent times, this universality/relativity debate has been situated in
North/South and East/West divides. The North versus South discourse
focuses on the relative importance of civil and political rights embraced by
the universalist North in contrast to the importance of economic, social,
and cultural rights prioritized by the relativist South in order to attain
economic development and well-being in a global society. 3 As has been
patent since the September 11 th events, the East/West divide centers
around religious fundamentalism.
In the context of the universality/relativity debate as it relates to the rule
of law, it is imperative to recognize that legal norms do not exist in a
vacuum. As the International Commission of Jurists' definition recognizes,
the existence of similar or even identical rules in different societies does
not lead to a uniform or identical application of norms. Thus, for there to
be a universal rule of law concept, there needs to be some adjustment in
the expectation of the consequences that will flow from the adoption of
such a legal norm. To be sure, every rule of law model will be foreign to
some society. For a global rule of law to exist and be successful, it must be
adaptable to each receiving society's social and cultural structures.54
Significantly, the notion of the rule of law, as it has evolved in the
dominant Anglo-American experience and in the formulation that has been
exported wholesale, is rooted in the Judeo-Christian ethic which, as
mentioned earlier, is grounded on the liberal tradition that focuses on the
individual. Such a notion of the rule of law is inextricably intertwined with
the dual western goals of democratization and capitalism. In this vein, the
rule of law discourse emphasizes the notion of individual rights, which can
be juxtaposed to other traditions and cultures with an emphasis on
communitarianism such as Greek and various Asian ones."
For example, a rule of law founded in ancient Greek philosophies
would center on the idea of a "polis" which seeks order that is attainable
rooted in universal truths or it is imperialist. This dilemma is premised on a simple but rarely
articulated proposition: that if human rights norms are culturally relative human creations, they are
necessarily imperialistic." Id. at 217.
53. Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and Relativity of Human Rights: American
Relativism, 4 BUFF. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 43 (1998); see also Berta E. HemAndez-Truyol, Human
Rights Through a Gendered Lens: Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., 1999) (showing a
critical consideration for analysis of a rule of law in the Americas).
54. Upham, supra note 44, at 33.
55. HAGER, supra note 31, at 20. The western notion of the rule of law does not dismiss
communitarianism, but it subsumes it into the notion of individual rights and posits that the best
way to attain communal interests is by protecting the individual's rights.
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through social or political structures. 6 Chinese scholars have cited
Aristotle's notion that the rule of law encompasses two ideas: one, that
there needs to be compliance with established norms; and two, that the
law's content is a good one. 7 Other contemporary Chinese scholars note
that Confucianism advocates a rule of law by virtue and ethics rather than
by norms.5"
Many Chinese scholars link the rule of law with other liberal goals,
including the notion of democracy and "other liberal values such as liberty,
equality, human rights, separation of powers, checks and balances, and
judicial independence."59 As one author has noted,
Chinese scholars appreciate that the rule of law developed in the West as
part of a dynamic historical process and has undergone distinct phases of
development. Thus one scholar pointed out that the nature of the Rule of
Law has changed as the West moved from the period of laissez faire
capitalism into the period of monopoly capitalism and welfare states.
Another characterized the earlier period as "individuals-oriented" and the
later period as "society-oriented." A third writer distinguished the two
stages by using the concepts of "a hard rule-of-law" (strict legal rules
with little discretion in their administration) and "a soft rule-of-law" (a
"living law" administered by the exercise of discretion and search for
substantive justice).6"
Indeed, while some western critics equate a rule of law under socialism
with the possibility of arbitrary and unfettered government action,6'
Chinese scholars argue that the rule of law under socialism is at a higher
level of evolution than the rule of law under capitalism. They explain that
the driving force of socialism is one of human emancipation because it
enables human beings to completely develop the full extent of their
62
capacities.
Two observations are appropriate to close this discussion on culture.
First, the rule of law and human rights are related, dynamic concepts that
develop and evolve with time and within historical, social, cultural,
political contexts of societies. Second, while human rights contain
universal values, they also are contextual to national, regional, and cultural
56. Nicholas Capaldi, The Liberal Paradigm inAffirmativeAction Law, 43 LOY. L. REv. 525,
555 (1998).
57. Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China
on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BAsrN L.J. 125, 131 (2000).
58. Id. at 129.
59. Id. at 133.
60. Id. at 132 (citations omitted).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 36.
62. Chen, supra note 57, at 136.
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specificities. Thus, the universality versus relativity debate in the context
of the rule of law appears to create a false dichotomy. While no wholesale
exportation of a western vision of the rule of law is going to fit across all
cultural and political histories, a general and generalized, flexible, global
notion of the rule of law, accepting of and acceptable to varied and various
cultures, will further the human rights project by protecting peoples and
communities from subordination, oppression, or arbitrariness.
IV. STRUCTURAL REALITIES OF THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law idea(l) requires a system of accountability of
government and its actors which includes a check against the bias,
irrationality, corruption, or abuse of those in power - be it the lawmakers,
the executive, the judges, or some outlaw group that nonetheless is in
control of the state or some part thereof- whose time might be occupied
by matters other than justice and just governance. It is inherent in the rule
of law ideal that government action has limitations.63 Notions of state
responsibility need to be an integral part of the rule of law.
Moreover, the rule of law idea(l) must recognize, embrace, and adapt
to the dynamic nature of law. Law can, and does, change as social values
and morality change. There must be structures that accommodate and
enable such social and moral changes and allow them to be reflected in the
law. In this regard, although considering law as dynamic in the context of
the rule of law, it would be a grave mistake to suggest that everyone must
absolutely obey unjust norms until they can be changed by formal
channels. Thus, with changing social mores and conduct, the rule of law
must mean something more than blind adherence to written laws; it must
mean pursuit of justice.64 Martin Luther King poignantly articulated this
sentiment when, quoting St. Augustine, he said "An unjust law is no law
at all."65 This is indeed a key principle of the rule of law vis-,A-vis human
right norms: unconditional or unqualified obedience to unjust laws is not
a requirement.
63. See supra note 3 1.
64. See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 12-13 (comparing the "rule book" and "rights" models
of the rule of law and noting that "compliance will achieve great injustice if the rules are unjust").
Significantly, justice itself is a contested concept. That discussion however is beyond the scope of
this essay. But see RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW (1992) (interrogating the notion of
justice as a system that was created and is based upon differentials of power).
65. Martin Luther King, Letter from Birmingham Jail, Apr. 16, 1963, available at
http://almaz.com/nobel/peace/MLK-jail.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
(Vol. 16
HeinOnline  -- 16 Fla. J. Int'l L. 180 2004
20041 PANEL V. HUMAN RIGH7S COMMI'I4ENTS IN THE AMERICAS: FROM THE GLOBAL TO THE LOCAL 181
Significant for human rights discourses, international customary norms
are rooted in natural law rights and are part of the fabric of law.66 Thus the
rule of law, beyond applying to government actions, requiring
accountability, and demanding justice, also protects individuals and
individual liberty and freedom. As such, the rule of law idea(l) provides a
normative and doctrinal basis for the respect for human dignity and justice
that the human rights framework embraces. In this regard, Calvin
Coolidge's statement to the Massachusetts State Senate on January 7,
1914, was quite foretelling of the principles that would be central to the
development of human rights laws. More than thirty years before the
Nuremberg Tribunal echoed these sentiments, Coolidge said
Men do not make laws. They do but discover them. Laws must be
justified by something more than the will of the majority. They must rest
on the eternal foundation of righteousness. That state is most fortunate in
its form of government which has the aptest instruments for the discovery
of law. 7
Beyond governments at one end of the spectrum of the rule of law and
the individual at the other, civil society - the collective of institutions,
groups, and individuals who create and express social values and morality
- has a role in ensuring the attainment of justice. Civil society and
government need to work congruently, with one checking the other's
jurisdiction so that neither has nor exercises unbridled power to oppress
individuals and suppress individual autonomy and freedoms. They also
must work coherently to request and guide necessary changes in the legal
structures when moral, social, and civil transformations so require.
V. CRITIQUES OF THE RULE OF LAW
As this work has shown, there are different conceptualizations of the
rule of law in different cultures. However, the ideal of a global rule of law
is captured by the International Commission of Jurists' definition in its
Rule of Law Project. That definition embraces the universality and
relativity of the normative and structural frameworks necessary for the
66. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38
("The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply... international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law .... ").
67. Calvin Coolidge, Massachusetts Senate President Acceptance Speech, Jan. 7, 1914,
available at http://www.calvin-coolidge.org/pages/history/speeches/spO10714.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2003).
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"rule of law" - not identical but similar norms, institutions and
procedures that history and tradition from different parts of the world with
different systems of governance and different political structures, cultural
histories, and economic backgrounds still consistently show to be basic to
the protection of persons from undue and arbitrary government intrusion
which enables persons to enjoy their dignity and personhood.68
Notwithstanding this ideal, the varied cultural settings in which the rule
of law applies has resulted in powerful critiques of the concept. Some view
the rule of law as nothing other than a tool of the powerful to maintain the
status quo in the legal system. The general consensus is that the status quo,
far from being neutral, serves to protect the powerful at the expense of the
disempowered. 69 This lack of neutrality in the rule of law runs contrary to
the ideal, traced to Aristotle, that in light of the law every person should be
equal; that it is one's humanity, not one's status in society, that requires
that laws be justly applied.7" As one commentator has stated,
[T]here need be no ultimate conflict between the Rule of Law and the
Rule of Love... we cannot be a nation of equal citizens under a Rule of
Equal Laws if only half of us have control over our bodies and our lives,
while the other half remain subject to the ultimate control of the state....
[A]II can at least share ... the desire to incorporate basic notions of
decency and compassion into a strong and principled Rule of Law.7
A concern with respect to the rule of law's neutrality relates to the
predominance of the "sameness" standard of equality in U.S.
68. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 10.
69. See Tribe, supra note 36, at 726.
[Tihe Rule of Law still has precious few sophisticated defenders these days. To some on the
left, especially in critical legal studies, the Rule of Law is little more than a mask that hides
the legal system's tendency to protect the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor and
the working class. And to some on the right, the Rule of Law is largely an inconvenience,
a myth to be winked at, if not openly mocked.
Id.; see also ROBSON, supra note 64, at 11, 24, passim.
70. Tribe, supra note 36, at 727 (noting that "[tihe roots of the Rule of Law go back at least
to Aristotle, and to the ideal that, as we face the laws' commands, none of us should stand taller
than any other; what those who govern think of you should matter not at all how the laws that
govern treat you. It is your membership in the human race, and not in any privileged circle, that
entitles you to have the law applied justly, without any prejudgment about your inherent worth or
lack of worth.").
7 I. Id. at 729-31.
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jurisprudence.72 Critical legal theorists, 73 including feminist theorists,7 4
critical race theorists,75 and queer/lesbian theorists,76 have highlighted the
flaws of the sameness standard noting that, once the norm is defined, those
who are seeking to be treated like the normative standard will be judged as
similar or on grounds not based on general societal values (and biases),
including the values (and biases) of the decisionmaker.77 This sameness
model may thus result in the hiding or veiling of the moral, psychological,
and emotional consequences of norms and raising "question[s] [about] the
value of procedural regularity when it denies substantivejustice." Indeed,
[s]ome writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times,
nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization
of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not
necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or
the litigants' lawyers, all of which may go unstated.79
72. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1989) (noting that "the rule of law model trains us
- that is, legal personnel - to 'treat like cases alike,' and to define relevant similarities
generally").
73. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUiDIEs MOVEMENT
(1983); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology
of Rights - Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563 (1984).
74. See generally FEMINISTLEGALTHEORY: ANANTIESSENTIALISTREADER (Nancy E. Dowd
& Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing
ed., 2d ed. 2003); GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER (Adrien
Katherine Wing ed., 2000).
75. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998); AREADERONRACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, ANDAMERICAN
LAW: A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH (Timothy Davis et al. eds., 2001); Kenneth Nunn, Law as a
Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. 323 (1997); Dennis W. Archer, A Diverse Directive: We
Need More Lawyers of Color to Help Promote the Rule of Law, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2003, at 8.
76. See generally ROBSON, supra note 64; RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOESTO LAW SCHOOL
(1998).
77. Robin West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 259,264 (2000);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987);
ROBSON, supra note 64, at 67.
78. Massaro, supra note 72, at 2110; see also H. Thompson, The Role of the Rule of Law in
the Liberal State, 1 NATAL U. L. & Soc. REv. 126, 132 (1986) (noting "[liberal critics] identify as
the principal shortcomings of the doctrine of the rule of law... its tendency to lead to an unbending
legalism and its failure to evaluate the substantive content of the law").
79. Massaro, supra note 72, at 2111-12 (footnote omitted).
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In sum, for the rule of law to be truly egalitarian and attain justice, rather
than simply be geared to the status quo, it must accommodate and embrace
social and political changes.80
Another challenge to the neutrality of the rule of law is the perceived
attempt to universalize a western vision. In this regard, some argue that the
exportation of the western rule of law effectively is but a rhetorical trope
to legitimize global power differentials.8 The patterns of the exportation
of the rule of law are viewed as fitting neatly into imperialistic practices -
some more subtle than others. Sometimes the rule of law is imposed on
states overtly; sometimes in a way that is masked by contract and made to
appear to be voluntary - evoking the label of "subtle blackmail."82
However, regardless of form, often economically deprived and less
powerful states must accept the western rule of law in order to have access
to the global market and to engage in economic activity necessary for the
states' survival.
The doctrine of the rule of law is also critiqued as being grounded on
capitalistic ideology. For example, Marxists view the rule of law as
facilitating the state's exercise of power on behalf of the interests of the
classes that control the means of production.83 To them, law should be
working in the interests of society as a whole. Consequently, it is the
substantive content and outcome as opposed to the procedural norms that
indicate whether the law is being deployed to oppress certain classes.84
80. Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L.
REV. 249, 265 (1993) (construing GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 8-42 (1988), "Walker defines the Rule of Law as a political
environment of constraining rules that nevertheless constantly are infused with contemporary social
values. Contemporary values do not form fixed and timeless values that define the Rule of Law
because they constantly are in flux."); see also Edward McWhinney, Western and Non-Western
Legal Cultures and the International Court of Justice: A Celebration of the Scholarship and
Teaching of Gray L. Dorsey, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 873, 878-79 (1987).
[Tihe Rule of Law need not be another convenient synonym for perpetuating the political-
legal status quo of yesterday, and [] the role of the lawyer and of the judge today consists not
merely of mechanically restating the old law but also of assuming responsibility for
imaginatively up-dating or re-writing it to correspond with new societal conditions and
demands.
Id.
81. See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: Study on US. Hegemony and the Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 383, 386 (2003).
82. Id. at 388; see also TAMANAHA, supra note 40, at 124 (noting "'voluntary' is not the same
as 'by choice' rather than 'out of necessity').
83. See Thompson, supra note 78, at 130.
84. See id. at 128.
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There is also a cultural component to the critique of the rule of law. For
example, Asian scholars have three main criticisms of the western rule of
law that is being exported wholesale. One is that its virtues are overstated
- a criticism that dovetails with the critiques about the disjointedness
between the notion of the rule of law and true justice. A second criticism,
which also parallels other critiques discussed above, is that it is a thinly
veiled attempt to impose the economic market goals of the United States
on the world. The third criticism is an interesting twist on the cultural
critiques as it posits that the rule of law is simply a proxy for establishing
a global system that reflects the U.S. legal culture of "legalism and
litigiousness." 5
More extreme critics claim that "[t]he liberal paradigm has destroyed
the rule of law."86 The rationale behind this statement is that, considering
the real state of the world, many equate the rule of law with legality.
However, this is a flawed equation as "[liegality simply means that there
are laws and says nothing about the quality of those laws."87
Yet other critics reject the formalistic notions of the rule of law in favor
of a goal of justice.8  Examples of laws that are anathema to notions of
justice are "laws that enshrine irrational prejudice, such as the
miscegenation laws . . .or the racial bias .. .or the irrational animus
toward gay[s].... [These] are not laws at all."89 In this regard, then, such
laws could be deemed to be illegitimate laws and the rule of law idea
would warrant that they not be followed. This critique, like the one that
differentiates between the rule of law and legality, notes that the traditional
85. Barry M. Hager, The Rule of Law: Defining It and Defending It in the Asian Context, in
THE RuLE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM, 1, 2 (The Mansfield Center for Pacific
Affairs, 2000).
86. Capaldi, supra note 56, at 553.
87. Id.
88. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Can Justice and the Rule ofLaw Be Reconciled?, 1I HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 597, 597-98 (1988) (construing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1963)).
Jerome Frank ... rejected the rule of law values of generality and uniformity in legal
precepts in favor ofjustie ... according to [his] view, the formal requirements of the rule
of law are either redundant or pernicious. Where justice in the particular case and the tenets
of the rule of law correspond, the rule of law is redundant. Where justice in the particular
case and the rule of law diverge, the rule of law is pernicious to the extent that it detracts
from achieving justice.
Id.
89. Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public
Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection
Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 192 (1998) (citations omitted).
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ideal of the rule of law means simply that there are substantive and
procedural norms to guide outcomes which may trump justice's goals.
In his critique of the rule of law, Morton Horwitz rejected its
classification as "an unqualified human good" because, although the law
"restrains power ... it also prevents power's benevolent exercise. It creates
formal equality - a not inconsiderable virtue - but it promotes
substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically separates
law from politics, means from ends, process from outcomes."9 ° The goal
of the rule of law ought to be to enable full personhood, human flourishing.
Any law that does not do so cannot be part of the rule of law. Human rights
becomes a check on the rule of law idea(l) and, thus, must become an
integral part of a truly universal formulation of the rule of law.9'
VI. THREE KEY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE RULE OF LAW
This section seeks to articulate linkages between the rule of law and
other legal concepts that affect its essence. First, the essay joins the rule of
law idea with the human rights idea and shows that human rights form the
outside parameters or limitations on flexibility of the rule of law. Second,
this section notes the interplay of local and global visions of the rule of
law. Finally, the piece engages the relationship between trade and human
rights and illustrates how human rights place similar limitations on private
or public trade conduct as human rights do on the exercise of sovereign
power.
90. Morton J. Horwitz, Book Reviews: The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86
YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1976-1977) (reviewing DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME
AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975), & E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975)) (emphasis added); see also Curtis E. Harris, An
Undue Burden: Balancing in an Age of Relativism, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363,453-54 (1993).
Harris notes that, in the United States,
[a]s [the] great reform movements [slavery, feminist] illustrate, there can be no certain
protection of individual dignity or liberty based on moral relativism. There is no right that
cannot be rationalized away, no tradition that cannot be minimized, no political trend that
cannot be forgotten or replaced. Power becomes the only safety and the rule of law becomes
the rule of five votes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
91. See Cicchino, supra note 89, at 193 (noting that "[t]he ultimate justifications
[constitutional morality] recognizes take human flourishing as their final end, and human
experience as their source and guide, and return to human experience in a never ending process of
refinement and revision," and also positing that "[a] statute or government policy whose end is not
rooted in human flourishing, and is not accessible through human experience, lacks the minimum
degree of reasonableness required by the Equal Protection Clause and represents a radical departure
from the rule of law.").
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A. Human Rights
The first connection this work addresses is the rule of law and human
rights. Flowing from Nuremberg, the observance, protection, and
enforcement of human rights are the most basic components of the rule of
law.92 The human rights linkage comprises two interrelated ideas. One is
that a state is not absolutely sovereign; how it treats persons is not without
limits.93 Those limits are human rights - rights that persons have because
of their existence as human beings. The other is that human beings are the
true actors in the international world; not solely objects, but also the
subjects of the laws.94 As the famous phrase from the Nuremberg judgment
reminds us "laws are broken by men not states," making it appropriate in
the international realm to punish men for violating those international
norms.95 In this regard, human rights concerns are not identical
everywhere. We live in a gendered, multiethnic, racially and religiously
diverse society. In considering rule of law, these diversities must be taken
into account, thus requiring a flexible approach to the rule of law that does
not sacrifice justice.96
B. International and Local Linkages
The second observation concerning the rule of law is that there are
connections between the international and the local rule of law ideas. This
notion flows seamlessly from the human rights connection that emphasizes
92. InternationalMilitary Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment andSentences, October]. 1946,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
93. Id.; Berta E. Hernbdez-Truyol, Globalized Citizenship: Sovereignty, Security, and Soul,
in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar Rodriguez eds.,
forthcoming 2004); Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 53; Berta E. Hern/mdez-Truyol & Kimberly A.
Johns, Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique
of Immigration and Welfare "Reform, " 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 547 (1998).
94. Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 53.
95. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 92.
96. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 10 (defining rule of law
considering different traditions and experiences in different countries) West, supra note 77, at 279.
A rule of law that accords her equal respect does not simply honor her choices and the
individual she becomes by virtue ofthem. It honors her needs, interests, pleasures, pains, ties
to others, and passionate desires as well. It reflects and respects her particularity, both
cultural and individual, as well as her universality, rationality, and potential freedom. It is
mindful of her universal needs-needs that are neither individually chosen nor traditionally
or culturally constructed - for a clean environment, a supportive culture, loving and safe
intimacy, and respectful institutions.
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the equality of all persons. At the core of the international rule of law is the
principle of the equality of all states.97 Moreover, it is neither disputed nor
disputable that both the international and the local rules of law are limited
by human rights and that local sovereignty and the exercise thereof is
limited by the international rule of law. For example, the international rule
of law expressly outlaws the use of force.9" This prohibition protects
against abuse of the vulnerable by the powerful and establishes an
international order to engage the principles of peace and security - all
with the well-being of individuals at its heart.99 Indeed, it is precisely the
safety and well-being of individuals that allows the legal exercise of force,
but even then only in two instances: in self defense, 0 0 or in the
maintenance of peace and security as authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. 1 ' A third emerging justification for the use of force is that of
97. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(l) ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.").
98. Id. art. 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
99. Id. pmbl.
We the Peoples of the United Nations [dietermined to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, ... and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small, . . . to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.... [hiave
[riesolved to [c]ombine our [e]fforts to [aiccomplish these [a]ims.
Id.
100. Id. art. 51.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise ofthis right ofself-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
101. Id. art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."); id. art. 42.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.
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humanitarian assistance, again directly for the protection of the
individual.10 2
To establish that the international rule of law trumps a local desire to
act to the contrary, one simply needs to cite to Nuremberg."°3 At
Nuremberg, the global judgment of justice overrode any local claim to
sovereignty. Hitler and his rule of terror in Germany could not deprive
Germans of life on German soil without accountability in the global stage.
Nor could Hitler do so to persons in other states that his forces had
overpowered. The norm that emerged is that what a state does vis-a-vis
human rights is, in fact, the whole world's business. How a state treats
persons within or without its borders, citizens and non-citizens alike, is an
international, not a purely local, matter.
So this connection of the international/local rule of law is part of the
balancing of power that provides a safety net constituting an international
(or regional) mechanism of accountability of states. In looking at the
Americas, the inter-American system has made inroads into effecting
justice. The states that utilize this system respect its decisions - decisions
that are made by the commission or the inter-American court, decisions
which are starting to create a regional check on the local protecting the
vulnerable or historically subordinated.' °4
C. Trade and Human Rights
The third and last connection I want to make with the rule of law is the
linkage of trade and human rights. Conversations about this linkage, much
like the origins of these fields of law, take place in separate spheres and in
different tongues. This is a curious development as I see these areas as
inextricably intertwined.
102. See Helen Duffy, Responding to September 11: The Framework of International Law,
16-17 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.interights.orglabout/Projects.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
103. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 92.
104. See generally Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004).
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If one looks at the origins of the formal development of trade law,"5
and of human rights law, 1 6 one sees a virtually identical cast of characters
- the same players on the world stage having conversations about
developing norms for interaction. These same players were the architects
of robust systems of norms that have developed along parallel tracks, as if
they were wholly separate and independent - worlds apart while
occurring in the same small world, occluding their interconnectivity and
interdependence.
Trade and human rights are the two cutting edge and hugely active
areas in global and local existence. There are, in today's world, two main
locations of vivid intersection - some might call them conflict - between
trade and human rights: labor and the environment. No trade agreement
discussions occur without some consideration of the impact of the
contemplated engagement on the environment - be it the preservation of
the Amazon, air pollution, or compromising of water quality - and on
labor.0 7 The relationship of human rights and trade becomes patently
evident in globalization discourses. Significantly, whenever and wherever
World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings are held - reflecting the trade
aspect of the binary - there also are labor and environmental group
protests evidencing the human rights intersection with trade.'0 8
105. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Al 1, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT was signed in October 1947 by 23 nations, with eight almost
immediately agreeing to apply the agreement (Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States - all market economies with democratic
governments). Initially, the GATT was to be the steppingstone to the establishment of the
International Trade Organization (ITO) which was to replace the GATT and be a U.N. agency
regulating world trade relations. Efforts for the ITO were halted when it became apparent that the
U.S. Congress would not ratify its Charter. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GAIT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLDTRADE DIPLOMACY (1990) (setting out the history of the ITO and the GATT).
106. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 21 7A (111). Three
years before the Havana Charter for the ITO was completed, the U.N. Charter entered into force on
October 24, 1945, which placed human rights center-stage in international relations. The Universal
Declaration was ratified by 48 states, with 8 states - Canada, USSR, Ukraine, Poland, South
Africa, Yugoslavia, and Saudi Arabia - abstaining.
107. A Survey of Globalisation, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2001, at 3-30.
108. See, e.g., After Seattle, A Global Disaster, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at 19-21;
William Greider, Global Agenda, After the WTO Protest in Seattle, It's Time to Go on the
Offensive. Here's How, THE NATION, Jan. 31, 2000; John Zebrowski, WTO Protest Leaders Plan
Disruptions in D.C., Los Angeles Activists Buoyed by Seattle Success, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4,
2000, at Al; Evelyn Iritani, WTO Talks Could Derail in Cancun; Negotiators Face a Backlash
Against the US. and a Widening Rift Between Rich and Poor, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 7,2003,
at 1.3; Susan Ferriss, Rich, Poor Countries Face Off at Start of World Trade Talks, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Sept. 1I, 2003, at A17.
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Both human rights and trade depend on the notion of the rule of law.
The rule of law elements that are pertinent to trade and economic
development include private property protection; freedom of contract;
norms governing market exchanges; legal enforcement of private
arrangements; equality under the law; and fair, efficient, and predictable
dispute resolution mechanisms.'0 9 Significantly, international trade
agreements also incorporate protection of human rights, such as Article XX
of the GATT which provides, in pertinent part,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption ... ..0
[Indeed, t]he values underlying WTO law - such as protection of legal
freedom, property rights, non-discrimination, rule of law, access to courts,
economic welfare and national sovereignty to pursue non-economic
policy objectives that are considered more important than liberal trade -
mirror corresponding human rights principles. Even though WTO law
nowhere explicitly refers to human rights, it serves manifold "human
rights functions" across frontiers."'
109. See Hager, supra note 85, at41.
110. GATI', supra note 105, art. XX; see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European
Integration Law for Global Integration Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/01, available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012301.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
111. Petersmann, supra note 110, at 38-39. He continues
[i]n contrast to most human rights treaties, the WTO guarantees of freedom,
nondiscrimination, and rule of law go far beyond national constitutional guarantees in most
countries which tend to limit economic freedom to domestic citizens and, for centuries,
discriminate [sic] against foreign goods, foreign services, foreign investors and foreign
consumers (e.g., by permitting export cartels). By extending equal freedoms across frontiers
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Thus, one commentator has observed that although the formulation of
WTO rules is as rights and obligations of governments, "they serve human
rights functions for protecting individual liberty, nondiscrimination, rule
of law and welfare-increasing cooperation among domestic and foreign
producers, investors, traders and consumers across frontiers."' 2
However, notwithstanding these human rights functions that the WTO
seems to fulfill,
[t]here are several areas in which developments in the WTO have caused
concern among human rights advocates. These include the right to health,
the right to food, the right to education, women's rights, indigenous
peoples' rights, and labor rights. Critics from within and outside the
WTO have also frequently raised general concerns about equity,
democracy, and transparency. 3
The trade regime did not come into life in a vacuum. Rather, it comes
into a world with preexisting rule of law obligations at the global and local
levels. Trade agreements that have been made possible by the WTO and
NAFTA structures cannot fly in the face of local controls of, say, securities
regulations or labor laws. Similarly, such agreements cannot contravene
global controls such as a prohibition against slave labor or racial
discrimination. Indeed, as seen above, Article XX of the GATT expressly
recognizes this and allows exceptions for public laws and morals, slave
labor, and health concerns - all basic human rights principles.
Recent events in Cuba confirm that human rights principles are the
parameters within which trade can and should operate. There is a fairly
strong move in Congress to alleviate the over four-decade old embargo." 4
This movement was supported by an interesting and broad coalition of
both conservative mid-western state legislators frustrated at the elimination
of a natural and convenient market for their food production enterprises
and liberal and libertarian congresspersons who found the travel
and subjecting discretionary foreign policy powers to additional legal and judicial restraints
ratified by domestic parliaments, WTO law serves "constitutional functions" for rendering
human rights and constitutional restraints more effective in the trade policy area.
Id. at 35.
112. Id. at 36; see also Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World
Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies, 24 HUm. RTS. Q. 1 (2002).
113. Dommen, supra note 112, at 13.
114. The United States imposed against Cuba an economic embargo on exports in 1960 and
on imports in 1962. In an effort to strengthen the impact on Cuba the United States passed the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1996. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1992); Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-114, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6021 (1996).
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restrictions an affront to individual liberties and freedoms. " This pro-trade
liberalization move, however, has come to a screeching halt. Why?
Because the trade liberalization idea has been trumped by the outrage over
Castro's most recent human rights abuses, including the rounding up of
some seventy-five Cuban writers and dissidents and sentencing them to up
to twenty-eight years in prison after what one reporter called "quickie show
trials worthy of Stalin."' 16
Another factor in the ceasing of trade liberalization talks was the April
11, 2003, summary execution by firing squad of three men who had
hijacked a passenger ferry on April 2." ' There is no question that they
committed a criminal act for which they should have been tried and
sentenced, but only after a fair trial, with the assistance of defense counsel,
and with an outcome that imposes a punishment proportional to the crime.
The problem that the Cuban example poses is an opportunity to explore
the linkages to the rule of law discussed above. The issue is not that there
are no laws in Cuba, but, rather, that the laws that exist may be arbitrary,
that they may be capriciously applied, and that the processes of their
application may be deficient per international human rights norms - both
substantive and procedural.
Thus, this example presents the importance of all three connections
discussed. The supremacy of human rights and the nexus between trade
and human rights resulted in the cessation of any conversations about
liberalizing trade once the state of Cuba was perceived to violate rights of
the dissidents and hijackers. The condemnation of the local process which
ostensibly failed to comport with international expectations shows
connection between local and international rules of law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The rule of law is an idea(l) about law, justice, and morality. It
considers what laws, norms, rules, procedures, systems, and structures
should be and what they should not be. Norms should be proclaimed
publicly by the peoples and/or their appropriate representatives. All the
people who will be bound by the norm, and not just an elite group, must
have a voice in norm creation. The public nature of the process informs
115. David Gonzalez, Cuban Crackdown on Critics Stalls a Drive to Ease US. Embargo, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at A18; see also Despite Crackdown in Cuba, Senators Push to Lift Travel
Ban, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 30, 2003.
116. Ann Louise Bardach, A Purge With a Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at § 4.13.
117. Peter Eisner, Cuba Executes 3 in Failed Hijacking of Ferry, WASH. POST, Apr. 12,2003,
at Al 3.
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those who are bound by the law as to what the rules are. The idea(l) also
suggests that laws, norms, and regulations need to be clear so that people
understand what rules are to be followed, and they need to be predictable
in their application so that persons know what behavior is appropriate.
Inherent in this formulation are three realities. One is that the law
governs people as well as the government itself. Next, persons should obey
the law. Third is that the norms we call law need to be obeyable - not
only in the sense of being known, knowable and predictable, but in the
deepest sense of being just.
Therefore, to be just and justly applied, predictable, understandable, and
obeyable, laws need to be both universal and culturally contingent. We do
not have, nor do I think want, a homogenized world; we do want an
ordered and peaceful world in which there is human progress, thriving of
peoples and cultures, and economic development. The limitations on the
rule of law are not universality or cultural contingency although there may
be cultural parameters within which a rule of law paradigm may be
deployed. The universal should not be used as pretext to decimate just and
viable local norms and the local should not be used as pretext to impose a
reign of corrupt, irrational, arbitrary, abusive, and discriminatory power.
So while law should be congruent with social values, neither social values
nor law can violate a higher order of justice either locally or
internationally.
Central to the rule of law idea(l) is that we, as humans, should be able
to conduct our lives without surprises, without governmental interference
that we cannot calculate because of its unpredictability or arbitrariness, and
with dignity. Key to this observation is the recognition of individuals'
existence within society as both autonomous individuals and community
members, free beings with dignitary rights because of their humanness.
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